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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Ohio's Statute of Limitations
Baird v. Loeffler, 69 Ohio St. 2d 553, 433 N.E.2d 194 (1982)
HE DECISION IN Baird v. Loeffler' is another victory for physicians and medical
kmalpractice insurers. It will not be well accepted by plaintiff's attorneys
or by others who advocate the rights of patients, especially minors, to be
compensated for injuries sustained by them due to a physician's negligence.'
The case focuses on an amendment to the Ohio Medical Malpractice Statute
which became effective July 28, 1975.1 The issue in Baird is the proper statutory
construction that should be given to the statute where a minor's cause of action
arose prior to the effective date of the statute.' In effect, the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision in Baird totally bars a minor from bringing a medical
malpractice action which accrued prior to the amendment of the statute, unless
brought for him by another within a reasonable time.'
Joseph Baird was born on April 30, 1961. He was treated by R. Kenneth
Loeffler, M.D. from April 1972, to June 1972, for malignant lymphoblastic
lymphosarcoma. The treatment was terminated on September 19, 1972, when
Joseph was eleven years of age." Until the effective date of the amendment,
July 27, 1975, Joseph had until age nineteen (April 30, 1980) to bring a
169 Ohio St. 2d 533, 433 N.E. 2d 19A (1982).
'Those who believe that a person's claim should be decided on the merits, not barred by a statute of
limitations.
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Page 1981). Enacted as emergency legislation by the Ohio General
Assembly in response to complaints by the medical profession and medical malpractice insurers. See
generally, Comment, Ohio's Statute of Limitations for Medical Malpractice, 38 OHIO ST. L. J. 125, 139,
140 (1977); Comment, Ohio's RX for the Medical Malpractice Crisis: The Patient Pays, 45 U. OF CIN.
L. REV. 90, 91, 96-99 (1976); Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical
Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L. J. 1417, 1429-34 (1975).
'69 Ohio St. 2d at 534-35, 433 N.E. 2d at 195-96. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.11(A) & (B) (Page 1971)
states in pertinent part:
(A) An action for ... malpractice, including an action for malpractice against a physician,
podiatrist, or a hospital ... shall be brought within one year after the cause thereof accrued....
(B) In no event shall any medical claim against a physician, podiatrist, or a hospital be brought
more than four years after the act or omission constituting the alleged malpractice occurred. The
limitations in this section ... apply to all persons regardless of legal disability and notwithstanding
section 2305.16 of the Revised Code, provided that a minor who has not attained his tenth birthday
shall have until his fourteenth birthday in which to file an action for malpractice against a physician
or hospital. Id.
'An action can be brought by a parent or guardian on behalf of the minor. However, the child cannot
bring his own action until he or she reaches the age of majority prior to the end of the statutory period.
OHIO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 17(B) (Page 1982).
'69 Ohio St. 2d at 533, 433 N.E. 2d at 195. In Ohio, a medical malpractice cause of action does not accrue
until the physician-patient relationship terminates. Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
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malpractice action against Dr. Loeffler.' Joseph filed a malpractice complaint
March 3, 1980, alleging that Dr. Loeffler's negligence caused him permanent
kidney damage.'
During the interim period between the date of the alleged negligent act
and the date that the action was brought, the Ohio General Assembly amended
the pertinent statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. 9 The
amendment set forth an absolute four-year limitation on all malpractice actions,
with a special provision allowing minors under the age of ten until age fourteen
to bring their action.'I The Ohio Supreme Court was faced with the question
of whether to apply this amended statue retroactively to Joseph's situation."
The Common Pleas Court of Stark County applied the amendment
retroactively and held that Joseph's action was barred by the statute of
limitations.' 2 Upon appeal to the Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals, the
decision was reversed and remanded. I 3 The court of appeals then certified the
record of the case to the Ohio Supreme Court for review because their decision
was in conflict with the First District Court of Appeals decision in Rembold
v. Christ HospitaL"
This was a case of first impression for the Ohio Supreme Court on the
issue of whether the medical malpractice amendment should be applied
retroactively in a case involving a minor's cause of action. In a five to two per
curiam decision, the court reversed the court of appeals' decision."I They ruled
that Joseph Baird's cause of action accrued when the physician-patient
relationship terminated, and. that the cause of action was tolled only until the
effective date of section 2305.11(B) (July 28, 1975).", Then, the statute of
limitations outlined in sections 2305.11 (A) and 2305.11 (B) applied and provided
Joseph Baird one year, or until July 28, 1976, to bring a malpractice action.
'The predecessor to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Page 1981) did not except the tolling of the statute
until a minor reached the age of majority, as the amended statute does. Id. The amended version expressly
excepts the tolling provisions of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.16 (Page 1981), which provides in pertinent
part:
Unless otherwise specifically provided in sections 2305.04 to 2305.14 inclusive,... if a person
entitled to bring any action mentioned in such sections... is, at the time the cause of action accrues,
within the age of minority ... such person may bring it within the respective times limited by such
sections, after such disability is removed. . . . Id.
'69 Ohio St. 2d at 533, 433 N.E. 2d at 195.
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Page 1981), amended effective July 27, 1975.
,OId.
"69 Ohio St. 2d at'534-35, 433 N.E. 2d at 195-96. The statute was silent on this point, and Ohio has
no legislative history to provide official insight on the issue.
"169 Ohio St. 2d at 533, 433 N.E. 2d at 195.
"Id. See also, Baird v. Loeffler, No. C.A. 5393 (Fifth Dist. Ct. App., Ohio, March 18, 1981).
"17 Ohio Op. 3d 350 (Hamilton Co. 1980). The Rembold court found that the statute applied retroactively
reasoning that the legislature's intent was to cut off stale claims. They refused to be influenced by sympathy
for the injured plaintiff. Id. at 354-57.
"69 Ohio St. 2d at 536, 433 N.E. 2d at 196. Justices W. Brown, Sweeney, Locher, Holmes, and Krupansky
concurred to form the majority. Chief Justice Celebreeze and Justice C. Brown dissented.
"69 Ohio St. 2d at 535-36, 433 N.E. 2d at 195-96. See supra note 6.
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His action was commenced after that date and therefore was barred. 7
Because it was a case of first impression, the Ohio Supreme Court had
to examine the rationale applied to related situations to reach a decision. First,
the court analyzed an earlier interpretation of the effect of section 2305.11 (B)
on a minor's cause of action. In Vance v. St. Vincent Hospital and Medical
Center, I a minor plaintiff over the age of ten brought an action against the
defendant hospital, alleging that their agents' negligence caused him perma-
nent injury. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that a minor ten or older is restricted
by sections 2305.1 I(A) and 2305.1 I(B) in bringing a cause of action and that
section 2305.16, the general tolling provision for minors and incompetents, did
not apply to toll the action until age eighteen. 19
The Vance court's interpretation of section 2305.1 1(B) was important to
the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Baird v. Loeffler. The Baird court did
note, however, that the Vance decision was distinguishable and therefore not
dispositive of the question at hand because it dealt with a cause of action that
accrued after the effective date of the amendment.20 Joseph Baird's action, as
previously noted, accrued prior to the enactment of the amendment.
After determining that the statute, if applicable, would bar the plaintiff's
cause of action, the Baird court addressed the issue of whether its retroactive
application would be violative of the Ohio Constitution.2' Article II, Section
28 prohibits retroactive application of statutes which destroy an accrued substan-
tive right. 22 This clause has been interpreted in numerous cases to allow the
shortening of a statutory period so long as it "still leaves the claimant a
reasonable time within which to enforce the right." ' 23 Joseph Baird had one
year after the effective date of the amendment to bring his malpractice action.
The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that one year after the effective date of
the amendment was a reasonable time and therefore Article II, Section 28 had
not been violated.24
The Baird court further supported its decision by reference to the prior
Ohio Supreme Court decision of Cook v. Matvejs. In Cook, the court made
the distinction between an amended statute of limitations that totally
"69 Ohio St. 2d at 535-36, 433 N.E. 2d at 196.
"64 Ohio St. 2d 36, 414 N.E. 2d 406 (1980).
"Id. at 41, 42, 414 N.E. 2d at 409.
2069 Ohio St. 2d at 535, 433 N.E. 2d at 196.
2'OH10 CONST. art. II, § 28 provides in pertinent part: "The general assembly shall have no power to pass
retroactive laws. ... Id.
22Id.
1169 Ohio St. 2d at 535, 433 N.E. 2d at 196, citing Smith v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 122 Ohio St.
45, 49, 170 N.E. 637, 639 (1930); see also Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628 (1877) (dealing with parties
to a contract).
2469 Ohio St. 2d at 535-36, 433 N.E. 2d at 196.
2'56 Ohio St. 2d 234, 383 N.E. 2d 601 (1978).
[Vol. 16:2
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"obliterates" an accrued cause of action and one that merely shortens the period
of time, leaving a reasonable time in which to bring an action.26 The Cook court
further qualified the term "reasonable" by defining it as "a reasonable time
after the effective date of the amendment, for the assertion of existing substantive
or vested rights (Emphasis sic)."27
In applying this reasoning to Joseph Baird's situation, the Ohio Supreme
Court noted that Joseph had one year after the effective date of the amend-
ment to bring a cause of action. They concluded that one year was a reasonable
time and therefore any action brought after this date was barred.2"
The dissent disagreed with this conclusion, contending that a "reasonable"
time did not remain for Joseph to bring an action.29 Because the statute of limita-
tions would run out while Joseph was still a minor, he never actually had any
time to bring an action. Therefore, section 2305.1 (B) should not be applied
retroactively.30
To understand better the situation that the Ohio Supreme Court was faced
with in Baird v. Loeffler, the rationale behind the Ohio Medical Malpractice
Statute as it existed prior to 1975 should be examined. Generally, a legislature
has several conflicting interests to consider when enacting a medical malprac-
tice statute of limitations: 1) to protect against stale claims;31 2) to provide stabili-
ty to the medical profession and to society;32 and 3) to protect the plaintiff's
right to have his or her claim determined on the merits." The resulting statute
of limitations is hopefully the result of a balancing of these interests.
As instituted in 1894 and prevailing until 1975, the Ohio malpractice statute
of limitations provided in relevant part that "an action for . . . malpractice
... shall be brought within one year after the cause thereof accrued .... "3,
As is evident from cases construing this provision, the courts viewed this statute
as harsh to the wronged patient. Through the years, both the Ohio Supreme
Court and the lower courts developed exceptions to the statute which resulted
2d. at 236-37, 383 N.E. 2d at 603-04; see also Gregory v. Flowers, 32 Ohio St. 2d 48, 59-60, 290 N.E.
2d 181, 189 (1972) (Leach, J., concurring in judgment).
2756 Ohio St. 2d at 237, 383 N.E. 2d at 604; quoting Leach, J., concurring in Gregory, 32 Ohio St. 2d
at 60, 290 N.E. 2d at 189.
"169 Ohio St. 2d at 535-36, 433 N.E. 2d at 196.
2'Id. at 536-38, 433 N.E. 2d at 196-98. Justice C. Brown wrote the dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice
Celebreeze concurred.
'OId. at 537, 433 N.E. 2d at 197. Joseph Baird was incompetent as a minor and would be barred as an
adult. Id.
"Melynk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St. 2d 198, 290 N.E. 2d 916 (1972); see also Comment, Ohio's
Statute of Limitations for Medical Malpractice, 38 OHIO ST. L. J. 125, 125-26 (1977).
"Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 267 N.E. 2d 419 (1971); see also Comment, Ohio's Statute, supra
note 31, at 126, 139-40.
"State ex rel. Moritz v. Troop, 44 Ohio St. 2d 90, 338 N.E.2d 526 (1975); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1.11 (Page 1981); Comment, Ohio's Statute, supra note 31, at 126.
"4The earliest codification was OHIO GEN. CODE § 11225 (1910). This codification was worded slightly
differently, but was based on an earlier session law: Act of May 18, 1894, 91 Ohio Laws 299.
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in the lengthening of the actual limitation period. 33 These exceptions developed
as a result of an increasingly liberal interpretation of the term "accrued.
3 6
The first such exception was outlined in Gillette v. Tucker.37 There, the
court rejected the traditional view that the cause of action accrued on the date
of the physician's negligent act. Instead, it held that the cause of action accrued
at the time that the physician-patient relationship ended.38
A second exception evolved from Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic39 and has
been commonly termed the "discovery rule." ' It was adopted because of the
difficulty in some situations of immediately discovering a physician's negligence.
The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the statute of limitations could be tolled
until the patient discovered, or should have discovered, a foreign object left
in his body.4
The third exception, and the most important exception in Joseph Baird's
situation, was the result of further legislative enactment. Ohio Revised Code
section 2305.162 provided a tolling provision for minors and those people im-
prisoned or of unsound mind until the disability was removed. This provision
protected the right of a person unable to bring an action at the time it accrued,
by tolling the statute of limitations until the disability was removed. 3
These exceptions greatly extended the period in which to bring a cause
of action and presented the possibility that a cause of action for medical malprac-
tice might never be precluded by the statute of limitations. This led, in part,
to the medical malpractice crisis of the mid-1970's. " This crisis was characterized
by a rise in malpractice insurance rates and an increased number of claims,
both due to the extended period that patients had to bring an action. 5 Malprac-
tice insurance became more difficult to obtain because of skyrocketing rates,
"See infra notes 36 to 43 and text accompanying.
"Id. See also Comment, Medical Malpractice and the Statute of Limitations in Ohio, 10 CAP. U. L. REV.
771, 775-76 (1981).
"767 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
"Id. at 133, 65 N.E. at 872. See, Comment, Ohio's Statute, supra note 31, at 127. This was for the benefit
of both parties. It allowed the patient a chance to discover the doctor's negligence and also gave the doctor
an extended period of time to correct his act of malpractice. Id.
392 Ohio St. 2d 198, 290 N.E. 2d 916 (1972).
"'Id. at 199, 290 N.E. 2d at 917.
"Id. at 202-03, 290 N.E. 2d at 918-19.
4'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.16 (Page 1981) provides in pertinent part:
Unless otherwise specially provided in sections 2305.04 to 2305.14, inclusive, .... of the Revised
Code, if a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in such section .... is, at the time the
cause of action accrues, within the age of minority, of unsound mind, or imprisoned, such person
may bring it within the respective times limited by such section, after such disability is
removed .... Id.
OHIO GEN. CODE § 11229 (Anderson 1938) provided for basically the same tolling effect.
"Id.
"See Comment, Ohio's RX, supra note 3, at 90,91, 96-99; Comment, An Analysis, supra note 3, at 1429-34.
"See Comment, Ohio's Statute, supra note 31, at 139-40.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:2
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insurance companies threatened to withdraw from certain states or specialities,
and strikes or work slowdowns by doctors were even threatened."
States took two basic approaches to alleviate the problem. Some established
joint underwriting groups whereby medical malpractice insurance could be more
readily obtained. Other states, such as Ohio, altered their procedural rules
applicable to medical malpractice actions. 7 A common method used by state
legislatures to limit the extended liability of the physician was the enactment
of a maximum time limit for medical malpractice actions."'
The amendment to Ohio's medical malpractice statute did not alter the
basic one-year time period for bringing a cause of action." However, in response
to pressure from the medical community and insurers, an absolute four-year
limitation was placed on all medical malpractice claims.5" The legislature also
expressly excepted the tolling provision for minors and incompetents (section
2305.16) so that they too would fall under the stricter provisions of the amended
statute. 5 I
The Ohio Supreme Court first applied the amended statute to a minor's
cause of action in Vance v. St. Vincent Hospital and Medical Center. 2 The
Vance court unanimously rejected the plaintiff's interpretation of the statute
that a minor of fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen would have until age nineteen
to bring a cause of action.53 Instead, the court interpreted section 2305.1 I(B)
as totally negating the tolling effect of section 2305.16. The Vance court con-
cluded that the only exception to this rule was for a minor under the age of ten.'
While Vance is illustrative of the application of the statute to minors, it
does not reach the primary issue in Baird v. Loeffler. As previously noted, Vance
"See Comment, Ohio's RX, supra note 3, at 90, 91, 96-99.
4'Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-33-103 (Michie 1980) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Page 1981).
See Miike, State Legislatures Address the Medical Malpractice Situation, 3 J. LEGAL MEDIcINE 25 (Sept.
1975), which summarizes the approach each of the states tok to alleviate the medical malpractice crisis.
Included is a chart showing which states authorized Joint Underwriting Associations. Id. at 30. See also
Comment, An Analysis, supra note 3, at 1417.
"New "absolute" limitations range in length from three to six years. Compare CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE §
340.5 (West 1982) (3 years), and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628(A) (West Supp. Vol. 4 1982) (3 years), with
IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1 (West Supp. 1982) (6 years), and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305. 1 l(B) (Page 198 1)
(4 years).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (A) (Page 1981).
"*OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (B) (Page 1981).
511d.
264 Ohio St. 2d 36, 414 N.E. 2d 406 (1980).
"Id. at 38 n. 3, 414 N.E. 2d at 407 n. 3. The plaintiff was seventeen years old when the cause of action
accrued. Suit was filed seventeen months later. Plaintiff-appellant contended that § 2305.11 (B) applied
to minors over fourteen, tolling the one year limitation period until he was eighteen. Then § 2305.11 (A)
would apply and allow him one year, or until age nineteen, to bring a malpractice action. Id. at 38, 414
N.E. 2d at 407.
'464 Ohio St. 2d at 42, 414 N.E. 2d at 409. Minors under the age of ten have until their fourteenth birthday
to bring a medical malpractice cause of action. Minors ten and older have only one year. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2305.11 (Page 1981).
Fall, 1982] RECENT CASES
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involved an action that accrued in 1976, approximately one year after the ef-
fective date of the amended statute." Therefore, the Vance court had merely
to interpret the legislative intent and apply it to the facts at hand. In Baird,
however, the alleged malpratice occurred in 1972, three years before the malprac-
tice statute was amended.5 6 Because Joseph Baird was a minor, the action was
tolled under the pre-amendment statute until he reached majority." As a result,
the Ohio Supreme Court could not simply apply the Vance court's interpreta-
tion of the amended statute. Instead, the Baird court first had to address the
more difficult issue of retroactivity.58
Several important considerations which must be taken into account when
determining whether to apply a statute retroactively are: 1) constitutional pro-
hibitions; 2) state statutory restrictions; and 3) legislative intent." On the State
level, Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution specifically prohibits retroac-
tive application of laws.6" It has been interpreted to apply only to substantive
and not to procedural or remedial rights.6 ' In Denicola v. Providence Hospital,
the Ohio Supreme Court outlined procedural or remedial rights as those which
provide "rules of practice, courses of procedure, or methods of review .... "62
As determined in Terry v. Anderson,63 statutes of limitation are remedial in
nature and therefore may be applied retroactively to existing causes of action.6"
The Terry court did place a restriction on their application, though; they could
affect existing rights provided that "a reasonable time is given for the com-
mencement of an action before the bar takes effect.'"'65 This restriction, as out-
lined by the United States Supreme Court, has also been adopted by the Ohio
Supreme Court in numerous cases.66
In reaching its decision in Baird v. Loeffler, the Ohio Supreme Court relied
on the fact the statutes of limitation had previously been determined to be
procedural. 67 Since Joseph Baird would not be barred from bringing an action
"64 Ohio St. 2d at 36, 414 N.E. 2d at 406.
1169 Ohio St. 2d at 533, 433 N.E. 2d at 195-96.
'7d. at 533-35, 433 N.E. 2d at 195-96.
"Id. at 534-35, 433 N.E. 2d at 195-96.
"See Ohio's Statute, supra note 31, at 148-49. See also Note, The Retroactive Application of Ohio Statutes,
30 OHIO ST. L. J. 401, 401-10 (1969).
6OHIO CONST. art. II, § 28 provides in pertinent part: "The general assembly shall have no power to pass
retroactive laws, . . ." Id.
"Denicola v. Providence Hosp., 57 Ohio St. 2d 115, 115, 387 N. E. 2d 231, 232 (1979); Smith v. New
York Cent. R.R. Co., 122 Ohio St. 45, 45, 170 N.E. 637, 637 (1930).
"157 Ohio St. 2d 115, 117, 387 N.E. 2d 231, 233 (1979), citing State ex rel. Slaughter v. Indus. Comm'n.,
132 Ohio St. 537, 9 N.E. 2d 505 (1937); Kilbreath v. Rudy, 16 Ohio St. 2d 70, 242 N.E. 2d 658 (1968).
6395 U.S. 628, 632-33 (1877).
64Id.
"Id. (citations omitted).
6"Cook v. Matvejs, 56 Ohio St. 2d 234, 236-37, 383 N.E. 2d 601, 603-04 (1978); Gregory v. Flowers, 32
Ohio St. 2d 48, 52-54 290 N.E. 2d 181, 184-85 (1972); Smith v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 122 Ohio
St. 45, 51, 170 N.E. 637, 639 (1930).
"69 Ohio St. 2d at 535, 433 N.E. 2d at 196.
[Vol. 16:2
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until one year after the effective date of the amended statute, they concluded
that this was a reasonable time, and that therefore, the amendment could apply
retroactively.68
As the dissent pointed out, however, Joseph's right to bring a malpractice
action expired when he was only fifteen years old. 69 Requiring a child to sue
before he reached the age of majority did not provide him with a "reasonable
time" within which to bring a cause of action;70 "[t]he child has no standing
to sue before he is eighteen years old and no right to sue thereafter."71 The
dissent provided a well reasoned, logical conclusion. They realized that the prac-
tical effect of applying section 2305.1 (B) would be to bar totally Joseph Baird's
cause of action.
By contrast, the majority failed to reach a fair and just conclusion because
they relied on the conclusion that, under the circumstances, one year was a
reasonable time in which to bring an action." The retroactive application of
a statute of limitations to cut off a vested right is harsh on a minor. By allow-
ing Joseph only until the age of fifteen to bring a malpractice action, the majority
precluded Joseph himself from ever bringing an action. As the dissent indicated,
the majority emphasized the rights of the medical profession and the insurance
companies over those of an injured child by so ruling. 3
The Baird majority indiscriminately relied upon their finding of
reasonableness in Cook v. Matvejs. 74 The Cook case involved a plaintiff, age
seventeen, who was injured in a car accident. The applicable statutes provided
that he could bring a personal injury action within two years of reaching the
age of majority (which was twenty-one at the time).75 After the plaintiff reach-
ed eighteen, the age of majority was reduced to eighteen.76 He filed suit on
his twenty-first birthday, but the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the amended
statute was applicable and barred his action.77 They reasoned that having two
years to bring an action after the effective date of the amendment was a
reasonable time.78
In applying this reasoning to the Baird case, the majority failed to make
"Id. at 534-36, 433 N.E. 2d at 195-96.
1Id. at 537, 433 N.E. 2d at 197 (Brown, J., dissenting).
"Id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
"Id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
11Id. at 535-36, 433 N.E. 2d at 196.
"Id. at 538, 433 N.E. 2d at 198 (Brown, J., dissenting).
"56 Ohio St. 2d 234, 383 N.E. 2d 601 (1978).
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page 1981) provides: "An action for bodily injury or injuring personal
property shall be brought within two years after the cause thereof arose." Id. This statute, construed together
with the statute for the tolling of a minor's claim (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.16 (Page 1981)) produced
this result.
"1OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.01 (Page 1980) (effective date, January 1, 1974).
'"56 Ohio St. 2d at 238, 383 N.E. 2d at 604.
"Id. at 237, 383 N.E. 2d at 604.
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a key distinction between the two cases. In Cook, the plaintiff was of majority
during the two year period that he had to bring the action after the effective
date of the amendment. In Baird, however, the plaintiff's right to bring an
action was barred before he ever reached majority and would have had the
capacity to bring an action."
The second consideration in determining whether this statute could be
applied retroactively, is the statutory restrictions against such application. Until
1972, Ohio Revised Code section 1.20 was in effect and controlled the effect
of an amended statute on the causes of action arising prior to its effective date. "
This provision allowed statutes to be applied retroactively unless the action was
actually commenced prior to the effective date of the amended statute."s
However, section 1.20 was repealed in 1972 and replaced by Ohio Revised Code
section 1.58 which provides in pertinent part:
(A) The reenactment, amendment, or repeal of a statute does not...
(1) Affect the prior operation of a statute or any prior action taken
thereunder;
(2) Affect any validation, cure, right, privilege, obligation, or
liability previously acquired, accrued, accorded, or incurred
thereunder; .... s
According to section 1.58, it appears that the legislature is barred from
applying section 2305.11 (B) retroactively in Joseph Baird's situation. He had
a vested right to bring a cause of action prior to the amendment of the medical
malpractice statute. Because his action was barred before he reached the age
of majority, he was effectively precluded from exercising that right. It can be
inferred from the language of section 1.58 that the legislature intended to make
a major change in its policy and not allow a statute such as section 2305.11(B)
to be applied retroactively. 3
A second statute that must be examined, is Ohio Revised Code section
1.4814 This statute does not bar a statute's retroactivity, but looks to the last
factor in determining retroactivity, the legislative intent. It states that "[a] statute
is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made
retrospective." 5
"'69 Ohio St. 2d at 537, 433 N.E. 2d at 197 (Brown, J., dissenting).
"Act of February 19, 1866, 63 Ohio Laws 22 (repealed 1972).
"Elder v. Shoffstall, 90 Ohio St. 265, 274, 107 N.E. 539, 541-42 (1914).
2OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.58 (Page 1978).
"See Reed v. Hollen, 7 Ohio Op.3d 109 (C. P. Carroll Co. 1977). OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1.58 (Page
1978). Prior to the enactment of § 1.58, the distinction was that procedural or remedial statutes could
be applied retroactively, but that those relating to substantive rights could not be. Section 1.58 is itself
indicative of the change because it leaves out any reference to remedial statutes (such as § 1.20 had), and
outlines a simple rule of retroactivity for both. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.58 (Page 1978).
1
4 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1.48 (Page 1978).
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Several cases have interpreted the effect of section 1.48 on the retroactive
application of statutes. In Young v. Alberts,s6 the court held that the amended
Ohio Medical Malpractice Statute did not apply retroactively to bar a claim
that arose and was filed prior to the July 28, 1975, effective date. 7 The Young
court refused to reach the substance versus procedure issue because there was
no legislative intent that the statute apply retroactively."8 Relying on section
1.48, the court simply stated that the malpractice statute could not be made
retroactive because the General Assembly did not even attempt to do so.''89
Similar reasoning was used in Reed v. Hollen9 ° to hold that a claim was
not shortened due to the lowering of the age of majority from age twenty-one
to age eighteen. 9 The Reed court relied upon section 1.48 and the artificial
distinction between procedure and substance in support of their decision that
the statute was not to be applied retroactively. 92 The Reed court also pointed
out that the case law holding statutes of limitation to be procedural and,
therefore, retroactive, predated section 1.48 and may have become "obsolete
because they are superseded by a legislative enactment." 93
The Baird majority failed to examine the legislature's intent with regard
to retroactivity and its application to the amended malpractice statute. Where
the statute was silent on the issue of retroactivity, the Baird court should have
looked to section 1.48, as the courts in Young and Reed did, and concluded
that section 2305.11(B) was not intended to be applied retroactively. It is
presumed that the legislature is familiar with the statutes that it has previously
enacted (section 1.48) and enacts new statutes with those in mind.94
CONCLUSION
Very few other states have dealt with the issue presented in Baird v. Loeffler.
The majority of courts that have addressed this or similar issues are in accord
with Baird and have concluded that the statutes of limitation that shorten the
"73 Ohio Op.2d 32, 342 N.E.2d 700 (C. P. Hamilton Co. 1975).
1
7Id. at 33, 34, 342 N.E. 2d at 701-02.
$ld.
"Id. at 33, 342 N.E. 2d at 701.
907 Ohio Op. 3d 109 (C. P. Carroll Co. 1977).
"Id. at 110.
"Id. at 115.
"Id. at 114. Cf. Comment, Comparative Negligence in Ohio: Prospective or Retrospective Application,
14 AKRON L. REV. 647,650-53 (1981). But cf. Denicola v. Providence Hospital, 57 Ohio St. 2d 115, 387 N.E.
2d 231 (1979) which appears to have diminished the importance of § 1.48. The issue presented was whether
a statute that the plaintiff conceded to be procedural violated § 1.48 when applied to an action that accrued
before the effective date of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.43 (Page 1981) (defining who was competent to
testify as a medical witness). The Denicola court preliminarily concluded that article I, § 28 of the Ohio
Constitution was not violated because the statute was procedural. But, the court failed to inquire whether
the statute was expressly made retroactive, find it was not, and then apply § 1.48, which would have barred
its retroactive application. Instead, the court further examined the procedure versus substance distinction,
and relied on pre-§ 1.48 case law to conclude that the statute was to be retroactively applied. 57 Ohio
St. 2d at 117-18, 387 N.E. 2d at 233.
"See Smith v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 122 Ohio St. at 56, 170 N.E. at 640-41.
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time in which an action can be brought can apply retroactively, as long as a
reasonable time is allowed after the amendment's effective date. 95 However,
these decisions have strong dissents that parallel the dissent in Baird v. Loeffler. 9 6
At least one state decided in favor of the minor child in a situation similar to
Joseph Baird's. 97
The Baird dissent very perceptively outlined the fallacies in the majority's
opinion. 9 Ohio, as well as numerous other states, appear to have overreacted
to the medical malpractice crisis of the mid-1970's and have appeared to weigh
the interests of physicians and medical malpractice insurers above the interests of
the injured plaintiff.99 This is particularly true in situations similar to that of
Joseph Baird, who effectively had a vested right to a cause of action barred
before he was capable of bringing the action himself.
The strong dissent in Baird v. Loeffler is a positive sign that some judges
are attempting to achieve a more equitable balancing of the two interests.
Hopefully, the opinion espoused by the dissent in Baird v. Loeffler will gain
strength as the panic from the crisis of the mid-1970's subsides.'
AMy L. O'NEIL
"See Olivas v. Weiner, 127 Cal. App. 2d 597, 600, 274 P. 2d 476, 478 (Los Angeles Co. 1954). This case
dealt with a similar issue as that dealt with in Baird v. Loeffler. The Olivas court concluded that a
"reasonable" time must have been allowed within which to assert the cause. The court held that this
reasonable period was the six-year limit imposed by the act. The plaintiff herein filed his action 12 years
after the effective date of the amendment. Id. at 600, 274 P. 2d at 478. See also Reese v. Rankin, 403
So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1981); Thomas v. Niemann, 397 So. 2d 90 (Ala. 1981).
"See Thomas v. Niemann, 397 So. 2d 90, 93 (Ala. 1981) (Embry, Faulkner, and Beatty, JJ., dissenting).
They indicated that an amendment to a statute of limitations applied retroactively unless there was clear
legislative intent to the contrary. The retroactivity was further restricted by the requirement that it provide
a reasonable time for the existing cause of action to be brought. Id. at 97. See also, Reese v. Rankin,
403 So. 2d at 162 (Faulkner and Embry, JJ., dissenting).
97Doran v. Compton, 645 F. 2d 440 (5th Cir. 1981). The Doran court looked to a statute similar to Ohio
Revised Code § 1.48 that provided that the statute would apply prospectively unless there was contrary
legislative intent; none was found. Id. at 449-52.
"169 Ohio St. 2d at 537-38, 433 N.E. 2d at 197-98 (Brown, J., dissenting).
Id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
"'The Ohio Supreme Court faced a very similar issue after deciding Baird v. Loeffler; in Meros v. University
Hosp., 70 Ohio St. 2d 143, 435 N.E. 2d 117 (1982), the plaintiff's cause of action for medical malpractice
accrued prior to the effective date of the amendment to the medical malpractice statute of limitations.
She was under a legal disability as the result of the negligence, having suffered brain damage. Her action
was brought more than one year after the effective date of the amendment. The court, relying on Baird,
ruled that § 2305.11(B) applied retroactively and that the plaintiff's cause of action was barred. Justice
Brown again dissented, contending that just as a minor should not be denied a day in court, neither should
a disabled individual. Chief Justice Celebreeze, who dissented in Baird, did not participate. Justice Locher
concurred in the dissent. Id.
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